Inside North Korea’s Special Forces: Special Ops Troops Deployed to Ukraine

Korean People's Army Special Operation Force (KPASOF)

Approximately 12,000 North Korean troops have reportedly been deployed to the Russia-Ukraine war, widely believed to be members of the Storm Corps (11th Corps), North Korea’s elite special forces. However, a more accurate assessment would be that the deployment primarily involves the Korean People's Army Special Operation Forces (KPASOF). In addition to the Storm Corps, operational units from the Reconnaissance General Bureau have also been dispatched, carrying out various missions to gain real-world combat experience.

North Korean Special Forces' South Korea's Blue House infiltration drill 

Date of Establishment: January 1, 2017
Country: North Korea 🇰🇵
Military Branch: Special Operation Force
Command Structure: Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea
Chief of the General Staff: Vice Marshal, Ri Yong-gil
Commander: Lieutenant General, Ri Bong-chun

The Korean People's Army Special Operation Force (KPASOF) is one of North Korea's elite military units. Compared to other infantry units, it is better trained and known for its high loyalty. It is considered a significant threat in the event of a future Korean War. However, some units lack the training and logistical support worthy of the “special forces” designation. Except for a few elite units, many are poorly equipped and less prepared for modern warfare—some reportedly perform worse than standard reconnaissance units. 

The KPASOF was first publicly unveiled during the April 15, 2017 military parade and was established as an independent branch akin to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, consisting solely of special forces.

Though many believe the KPASOF is a rebranded version of the so-called Storm Corps (11th Corps), it is more accurately described as North Korea’s version of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), incorporating the Army's 11th Corps, elite naval and air force special units. Despite the structure, its actual capabilities are considered lacking, comparable more to light infantry or commando commands in other countries.

Beyond KPASOF, North Korea also operates other special forces under different corps and unit commands, sharing similar roles but differing in mission intensity, infiltration range, and operational complexity.

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Organizational Structure (KPASOF):

(*Note: “Sniper” in this context is a direct translation of the Russian word "strelkovy" meaning “rifleman,” not the Western concept of a precision sniper.)

Army (11th 'Storm' Corps and subordinate independent brigades):

• 1st Sniper Brigade
• 2nd Sniper Brigade
• 3rd Sniper Brigade
• 4th Light Infantry Brigade
• 5th Light Infantry Brigade
• 6th Light Infantry Brigade
• 7th Light Infantry Brigade
• 8th Airborne Assault Brigade
• 9th Airborne Assault Brigade
• 10th Airborne Assault Brigade

Navy:

• 29th Maritime Sniper Brigade (West Sea Fleet, Unit 252)
• 64th Maritime Sniper Brigade (East Sea Fleet, Unit 863) [Tasks: Suicide attacks and amphibious assault on U.S. reinforcements in East Sea]

Air Force:

• 11th Airborne Sniper Brigade 
• 21st Airborne Sniper Brigade

Undisclosed Units:

• 41st Amphibious Assault Battalion [Purpose: Surprise attacks and disruption in the West Sea Islands, including Baeknyeong Island]
• Unnumbered Mountain Light Infantry Unit [For post-penetration mountain operations]

These units have been identified through military parades, propaganda videos, and South Korean defense white papers. 

KPASOF is primarily built around the Army’s 11th Corps. However, naval and air force sniper troops have been observed in parades marching in KPASOF formations while wearing their respective patches. This suggests that these units fall under their respective branches in peacetime but shift under KPASOF command during wartime.

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Unit Classifications:

Light Infantry ("Lightning") are lightly equipped for rapid infiltration in Korea’s mountainous and urban terrain. The nickname "Lightning" is reserved for KPASOF light infantry. Other corps-level light infantry units are far less equipped and trained.

Light Infantry

They do not wear armored helmets and move on foot. Due to the 11th Corps' operational nature, some support vehicles may be allocated, but these units rely mainly on speed through lightweight equipment—not modern heliborne or mechanized infiltration. Globally, there are no real equivalents, and they compensate for technological inferiority with mass infantry use.

Commandos ("Thunderbolt") are elite troops distinct from traditional snipers. The title "Thunderbolt" applies only to KPASOF commandos, not other corps-level commando units.

Commando

A key characteristic that sets them apart from light infantry is their heavy armament. While light infantry operates under the vague concept of performing combined operations, raids, flanking maneuvers, and breakthroughs via rapid infiltration, Commandos undertake missions with relatively clear objectives. For instance, their goals include striking key South Korean military bases or targets, or neutralizing politically and socially significant infrastructure.

In comparison to South Korean forces, these units are similar to the Army Special Forces Regiment (or brigade), as they are organized directly under corps command and tasked with executing precise strike missions against designated targets within the corps’ operational plans.

Airborne Troops ("Thunderclap") are air-assault infantry infiltrating the rear via aircraft. Unlike Russian VDV or Chinese Airborne Corps, they do not air-drop mechanized units. Instead, they focus on establishing secondary fronts in South Korean rear areas using Il-76s, An-2 biplanes, gliders, or even helicopters. Units inserted by helicopters are categorized separately as rotary-assault troops.

Paratrooper

They resemble special forces in other countries only in their air insertion role but not in capability. North Korea’s airborne units are more like a lightweight adaptation for Korea’s short operational depth.

Maritime Commandos are naval special operations units tasked with infiltrating enemy facilities or vessels using hovercraft, semi-submersibles, and other assets. Command likely transfers to KPASOF in wartime. Two brigades have been identified.

Maritime Commando

Another mission of the maritime snipers is reportedly part of their wartime operational plan, which involves infiltrating and conducting a surprise suicide attack on the U.S. 7th Fleet, reinforced during wartime.

During the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong in 2002, maritime commandos from the 29th Brigade were disguised as crew aboard patrol boat 684 and opened fire on South Korean sailors. Snipers on board targeted key personnel, resulting in the deaths of officers and sailors. 

South Korea's Marine Corps is a rough comparison, but unlike the multi-role ROKMC, North Korea’s maritime commandos are strictly fleet-level infiltration forces for raids and guerrilla operations.

Air Commandos share equipment and infiltration methods with airborne troops but differ in mission. They infiltrate to destroy air force infrastructure such as airfields, aircraft, radar sites, and anti-air systems. Though part of the air force, they operate similarly to commandos.

Air Commando

They are visually distinguishable by wearing air force patches and blue commando insignia, unlike the army-based airborne troops.

No equivalent exists in the South Korean Air Force, as its CCTs serve as mobile control towers and SARTs focus on rescuing pilots and VIPs.

The 41st Amphibious Assault Battalion was revealed at the July 27, 2023 military parade. Its mission is to infiltrate and seize ROK-controlled islands like Baeknyeong Island in wartime. Its uniform patch and unit flag indicate it is a KPASOF army special unit. The flag date suggests it was founded on May 7, 2017. 

41st Amphibious Assault Battalion

Mountain Infiltration Units (unidentified) likely serve to disrupt operations in South Korea’s mountainous rear areas. Based on their expected range, they are estimated to be brigade-sized.

A notable feature is that they wear replicas with designs and colors nearly identical to the South Korean military’s granite combat uniform, which provides some insight into their intended purpose and the means by which this unit is operated.

Mountain Infiltration Unit

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Other North Korean Special Units (Non-KPASOF):

• Light Infantry: Corps-level divisions, brigades, or battalions
• Commandos: Corps-level commando brigades
• Reconnaissance: Reconnaissance General Bureau agents, wartime/peacetime infiltrators, forward-deployed recon battalions
• Border Guard: GP/GOP security, sometimes acting as rapid response units
• Others: Special operation battalions under the General Staff’s Operations Bureau (Unit 525)

Notably, many high-impact infiltration events like the Gangneung submarine infiltration incident in 1996 were carried out not by KPASOF or the 11th Corps, but by operatives from the Reconnaissance General Bureau.

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Criticism of KPASOF Capabilities: 

In 2011, Gen. Walter L. Sharp, then Commander of USFK and the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, told South Korea’s National Defense Committee that 200,000 personnel were in North Korea’s special forces. Of those, 60,000 were considered “elite” units capable of high-level missions like the Cheonan sinking. The remaining 140,000 were more like light infantry.

Even the so-called elite 60,000, however, largely lack autonomy and advanced skill sets. Their training covers only basic sabotage and disruption—not the level expected of true “operators.”

Western Tier 1 special forces (e.g., Delta Force, DEVGRU) are national assets requiring immense investment—over $2 million per operative. Even Tier 2 forces like the Green Berets cost tens of millions of Korean won per soldier to train. In contrast, North Korea lacks both the funding and infrastructure to train elite troops at this level.

True special forces training requires not just money but a pipeline of intelligent and physically gifted recruits, a robust infantry foundation, and a curriculum supported by well-integrated military institutions. Most of this is absent in North Korea.

Even basic marksmanship training in elite Western units involves tens of thousands of rounds per month per soldier. According to Delta Force veteran Eric L. Haney, a Delta operator in the 1970s would fire 50,000 rounds monthly. North Korea simply cannot afford this level of training.

In conclusion, North Korea's mass production of so-called special forces is mostly for show. The real metric of special operations capability is not how many troops wear the title, but how many can execute precision missions under pressure—and whether the infrastructure exists to support and sustain them. In this regard, North Korea falls short.

This article draws on information from South Korea’s Defense White Papers, North Korean online media, and parade videos. 

#SpecialForce #KPASOF #JSOC